NYU Tandon researchers develop simple, low-cost method to detect GPS trackers hidden in vehicles, empowering cyberstalking victims

Novel algorithm transforms commercial radio device into user-friendly, effective tracker detector

tinySA spectrum analyzer installed on a steering wheel

tinySA spectrum analyzer installed in a vehicle, detecting presence of a hidden GPS tracker. Photo credit: Mo Satt

A team of researchers at NYU Tandon School of Engineering has developed a novel method to detect hidden GPS tracking devices in vehicles, offering new hope to victims of technology-enabled domestic abuse.

Overseen by NYU Tandon assistant professor Danny Y. Huang, the research addresses a growing problem: abusers secretly placing GPS trackers in their partners' or ex-partners' vehicles to monitor their movements. Traditionally, detecting these devices has been difficult and expensive, leaving many victims vulnerable to continued surveillance.

"The tech industry has created many tools that can be repurposed for cyberstalking, but has invested far less in technologies that protect privacy," said Huang. “We believe this innovation has the potential to significantly empower victims of domestic abuse by providing them with a readily accessible way to regain their privacy and safety."

Huang holds appointments in both the Electrical & Computer Engineering and Computer Science & Engineering departments. He is also a member of NYU Center for Cybersecurity, NYU Tandon's Center for Urban Science + Progress, and Center for Advanced Technology in Telecommunications.

"GPS tracking in domestic abuse situations is unfortunately common," said Moshe (Mo) Satt, a Ph.D. candidate working under Huang who is the lead author on the research paper that he will present at USENIX VehicleSec '25, a major cybersecurity conference, in August 2025. Satt is the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) at the NYC Department of Sanitation and teaches several cybersecurity courses at the graduate and undergraduate levels as an NYU Tandon adjunct faculty member. "We wanted to develop a tool to combat it that is inexpensive and potentially very user-friendly."

The team's innovative approach relies on tinySA, a $150 palm-sized spectrum analyzer typically used by amateur radio enthusiasts for testing antennas and debugging wireless equipment.

Using this commercially-available device, the researchers developed a specialized algorithm that distinguishes weak tracker signals amid cellular transmission noise by monitoring LTE IoT uplink frequency bands. This approach — the first to reliably detect concealed 4G LTE IoT cellular GPS vehicle trackers using affordable equipment — isolates signals sent from concealed devices to nearby cell towers, solving technical challenges in determining which frequencies to scan, interpreting results, and filtering false positives.  

For victims, the setup can potentially be used as a mobile detection system while driving. If the user observes regular signal peaks on the tinySA during or after a drive, they can likely identify the presence of a cellular GPS tracker without requiring technical expertise. The setup could detect hidden GPS tracker signals within a range of up to three feet, according to the study.

The research addresses a significant public safety concern affecting approximately 13.5 million stalking victims annually in the United States, 80 percent experiencing technological stalking. In some cases, this surveillance has led to violent attacks.

The researchers are developing several pathways to real-world implementation, including smartphone integration, automated "black box" detection systems that could notify the user if a tracker is detected, partnerships with abuse support organizations, and a mobile detection service model similar to roadside assistance.

In addition to Satt and Huang, the paper’s authors are Donghan Hu, a NYU Tandon postdoc working under Huang, and NYU Tandon Phd candidate Patrick Zielinski.

This research was made possible through funding from the NYU Center for Cybersecurity, NYU mLab, and NYU Tandon School of Engineering. Additional support was provided by the ARDC (Amateur Radio Digital Communications), ARRL (American Radio Relay League), Cornell Tech CETA (Clinic to End Tech Abuse), KAIST System Security lab, NYU OSIRIS, and NYU Tandon UGSRP (Undergraduate Summer Research Program).


Satt, Moshe & Hu, Donghan & Zielinski, Patrick & Huang, Danny. (2025). You Can Drive But You Cannot Hide: Detection of Hidden Cellular GPS Vehicle Trackers.